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NATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES AND THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESSES 
 
ABSTRACT 
We need measures and tests of the effects of national values if we are not to over- or under-attribute 
management behavior differences to them, but complex institutional and industrial influences make 
this difficult.  Here, we examine international differences in the purposes of firms as expressed by 
CEOs, which subject to institutional and industrial factors as well as national values.  Having explored 
these purposes in investment decisions of large public companies, we adopted a ‘quasi-experimental’ 
approach to measure and test national values’ influence in owner-managed firms in different cultures.   
We found national values influencing business aims, but not time frames or stakeholders, where other 
forces were acting.  So they are important, but we can only reliable attribute behavior to them on the 
rare occasions where other forces are not at play.  Good measures of values’ effects may themselves 
aid understanding of the background to international business negotiations and partnerships.  
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NATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES AND THE PURPOSE OF BUSINESSES 
Introduction 
Comparative international research has long recognized that there seem to be considerable differences 
between countries in what businesses strive to achieve (e.g. Pascale & Athos, 1981; Lawrence & 
Edwards, 2000).  The purpose of human activity being value laden, some different measured cultural 
values have been suggested to be important (e.g. Schneider & Barsoux, 2003; Hofstede, 2001; 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997).  We can expect managers to reflect the norms of those that 
surround them, as expressed by these values, in what they strive for with their businesses.  Here we 
ask whether business purposes can be empirically linked to the national cultural contexts in which 
they are embedded, as measured by previously researched national values.   
Other contextual differences between countries will be important as well.  Different industrial 
foundations present different competitive forces and customer demands, and these will inevitably 
influence business purposes.  Different institutional arrangements are a clear reason why management 
behavior varies between countries (Hickson & Pugh, 1995), and this has been recognized in the body 
of ‘new institutional theory’ research (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995).  For example, 
ownership and governance structures differ between countries for historical reasons (Pedersen & 
Thomsen, 1997), and these influence management behavior (e.g. Eisenmann, 2002; Schulze et al., 
2003; Thomsen & Pedersen, 1999).   
Here we will develop some hypotheses towards business purposes from the national values 
research, and will qualitatively explore them in strategic investment decision-making in vehicle 
component manufacturers in four countries.  With strong grounds for believing that institutional and 
industrial factors are important as well, we have to separate these from the possible influence of 
national values when we come to test them.  By using a quasi-experimental approach among CEOs of 
firms in France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and with a tight matching process and the 
use of appropriate statistical methods, we will try to attribute observed behavior differences to the 
countries’ national cultural values with greater confidence than has been possible hitherto. 
Business Purposes 
Strategic management research has long emphasized the notion of strategic ‘purpose’ or ‘intent’ of 
businesses, which managers craft strategies which will enable their firms to achieve them (Hamel and 
Pralahad, 1989).  From this research, mainly within single country settings, three clear aspects of 
business purpose have emerged.   
One is concerned with the bodies or groups for whom the business has purpose: the notion of 
stakeholders reflects how managers may well recognize different people or groups in whose interest 
managers develop their strategies.  Managers who devise strategies are often acting in agency 
relationships for others for whom the firms actually exist, possibly through ownership, or through  
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Table 1: Contrasting shareholder and stakeholder perspectives 
Organizations: Shareholder Perspectives Stakeholder Perspectives 
Emphasize: profitability responsibility 
Are seen as : instruments joint ventures 
Aim to serve:  owner(s) all involved 
Are successful if: shareholder value rises stakeholders satisfied 
Face major difficulty ensuring: principal’s interests pursued stakeholders’ interests balanced 
Govern through: shareholder non-executive directors stakeholder representation 
See stakeholder management as: a means to shareholder ends an end & a means 
See social responsibility as an: individual matter individual & organizational matter 
Serve society by pursuing: self interest joint interest 
Source:  Derived and refined from De Wit & Meyer, 1999, p.433. 
 
other legal entitlement.  Shareholder value perspectives regard owners as the main or only 
stakeholders (Rappaport, 1986), but stakeholder perspectives include all ‘individuals and groups that 
are affected by the strategic outcomes achieved and who have enforceable claims on a firm’s 
performance’ (Freeman, 1984, p.53).  Stakeholder groups can include capital market (shareholders 
and capital providers); product market (primary customers, suppliers, host communities, governments 
and unions); and organizational (managers and employees) (Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983) but those 
with power and value have the greatest influence on a firm’s actions (Hinings et al., 1974), and 
shareholders have a legitimate but not exclusive interest (Table 1).   
More directly, it has been recognized how managers appear to pursue different aims, which much 
research has recognized as ‘the agency problem’, is so far that manager’s goals for their firms can 
differ from those of the firms’ owners (Albert, 1995; Whitley, 1992).  A ‘shareholder value’ 
perspective emphasises financial returns, which has been particularly associated with firms where 
ownership and management are separated as has long been in the Anglo-Saxon sphere.  ‘Stakeholder’ 
approaches, in acknowledging other interests as well results in wider outcomes, has aims such as the 
overall strength and scale of the business.   
Third, research has identified that the timeframes within which managers intend to achieve their 
goals also differ.  Aims and objectives may be short term or long, looking towards the quarterly report 
or the long-term strategic outcome.  This can lead to an agency problem, where management and 
ownership are separated and their interests differ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Stock-
market owners may value long term prospects, but managers often have incentives and budgeting 
systems that lead to short-term thinking (Hoskinsson et al., 1993; Wooldridge & Snow, 1990).   
Our dependant variable, the purpose of business, is complex and subjective, and our three 
measures of it (stakeholder orientation, aims, and timeframes) can not only reflect a range of 
industrial, institutional and cultural factors, but also each other.  Different stakeholders for example, 
may have different aims and time-frames, and recognizing more stakeholders may broaden the range 
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of recognized aims, and affect the time-frames for achievement.  If firms have long-term goals, their 
aims are more likely to include developments which take longer, with benefits in the long rather than 
the short term.  Our goal here is to see if they are collectively or separately associated with national 
values and not to investigate the interrelationships, but we will have to reflect these possible 
interconnections in our research approach.  We will now examine how some specific values may 
influence these three aspects of business purpose.   
National Values and Business Purposes 
To examine how national values may influence business purposes, we take an ‘operational’ view of 
culture (Goodenough, 1971), seeing it as the shared beliefs or standards which guide CEOs as to their 
business purposes through the cultural conventions of the context in which they all work (Usunier, 
1998, p. 20).  CEOs and senior managers may well hold different values and beliefs, and these might 
be influential as well, but we will avoid the ‘ecological fallacy’ and keep our analysis at the level of 
firms overall (see Schwartz, 1994).  While research has attempted to associate national cultures with 
many aspects of management behavior (see Kirkman et al., 2006), there has not been a study 
specifically of how the pattern of business purposes in nations reflects the different national cultural 
contexts in which they are developed.  We will now examine specific national values measurements 
that indicate facets of these cultural contexts to which firms adapt in their business stakeholders, aims 
and time frames, and will hypothesize how they might do so. 
From the many measurements of national values, we will bring together individual values 
measures from two of the best known and most replicated.  Hofstede’s (2001) differentiation of 
national values in a large number of countries, based on social-psychological research amongst IBM 
employees (mainly managers and professional workers) has been most widely used and has received 
substantial corroboration (e.g. Sondergaard, 1994; discussed in Smith et al., Ch. 3).  Trompenaars and 
Hampden-Turner (1997) used a broadly similar approach to Hofstede, but with a larger, wider, less 
homogenous, and less standardized data set.  These researchers identified two aspects of national 
values that are highly relevant: values towards people and values towards time.  There are newer, 
other less extensively corroborated and used empirical evaluations, including Schwartz (1994; 1999), 
House et al. (2004), Inglehardt et al. (2004) and Leung et al. (2002).  While these do not offer values 
types so relevant for this study, we benefit from knowing that the values that Hofstede and 
Trompenaars identified over a quarter century ago appear to be still at play (Kirkman et al., 2006).   
Person Orientation Cultural Values and Business Stakeholders 
One reason why managers’ judgments as to ‘who the firm is for’ may vary internationally is that 
different jurisdictions allocate power to different stakeholder interests differently (Thomsen & 
Petersen 1999).  Company law gives UK and US firms’ owners the exclusive power to hire and fire 
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the managers, and to close or retain the firm, justifying the shareholder focus there (Grant, 2002).  
Elsewhere (e.g. France and the Netherlands) managers must take employees into account, and in 
Germany, local communities as well; it is not just the presence of representation rights, but that the 
whole corporate governance structures are different (Clarkham, 1994).  Commercial conditions can 
also affect the stakeholders’ power: when benign, managers may have flexibility to regard wider 
groups, but when survival is at stake, focus will be on those, such as owners, who determine it.   
But stakeholders are defined by beliefs and values in society as well.  There may be a culture of, 
for example, individual or family owners adopting other stakeholders, reflecting values (as did, for 
example, Cadbury, Quaker, Johnson and Johnson, Lego and Hershey).  It is differences in the 
stakeholders recognized by senior managers who are determining the strategy for their firms that we 
are interested in here, where there may well be cultural expectations.  Here, two measures of ‘person 
orientation’ (Table 2) appear to be of relevance.  These examine the extent to which there is a focus 
on people within businesses, in comparison with the job to be done, or the business result.   
Hofstede’s (2001) ‘masculinity and femininity’ is a composite measure of various social and 
interpersonal values concerning how people conceive of themselves in relation to others.  In his 
‘feminine’ societies, people are expected to be concerned with people and relationships, and 
emphasize the importance of these in life, and in ‘masculine’ societies, are expected to be more goal 
focused, emphasizing decisiveness, assertiveness, ambition and toughness in a search for material 
success.  From Lewin’s (1951) notion of how people have ‘public’ space, the elements of 
themselves about which they are open to others, and ‘private’ space, the elements that they guard 
more closely, Trompenaars and Hampden-turner (1997) distinguish ‘diffuse’ from ‘specific’ 
business cultures.  In diffuse cultures, people’s public spaces and private spaces are not separated, so 
their ‘public’ work roles cannot be distinguished from their personal or ‘private’ ones, and people 
are regarded in terms of their being a whole person and one determined by a specific work role or 
contract.  In specific business cultures, people’s actions, behaviors and relationships are specific to 
purpose, so the purposes they pursue will be determined by the specific work purposes, contracts, or 
roles that they are tasked to fulfill, and the issue of individual beliefs or values is irrelevant. 
Table 2:  Empirically measured values of person-orientation in different countries 
VALUES MEASURE: Femininity (vs Masculinity) Diffuse (vs Specific) orientation 
Author: Hofstede  (2001, p. 500) 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner  
(1997, Pp. 87-97) 
Netherlands HIGH HIGH 
Sweden HIGH MEDIUM 
France MEDIUM/HIGH MEDIUM 
Japan LOW HIGH 
Germany LOW MEDIUM 
Italy LOW MEDIUM 
US LOW LOW 
UK LOW LOW 
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Managers in person oriented cultures can be expected by others within their social contexts to 
recognize that people and relationships are more important than other and particularly material 
achievements in life, and this would be reflected in the decisions that are made and things that are 
achieved generally within those cultures.  Managers failing to recognize that it is the purpose of firms 
to meet the needs of many people; not only shareholders, but also employees and others connected to 
the firm would be regarded as strange, and may well face direct opposition.  The pressures may not 
only be external; managers are likely themselves to be acculturated to expect to recognize a variety of 
stakeholders.  In person-oriented cultures, we can expect the interests of a wide range of stakeholders 
being considered in the strategy process, the stakeholder perspective noted above, and not only the 
owner interests as in the shareholder perspective.  In task oriented cultures, managers who gave such 
benign consideration for other groups would be seen to lack the toughness, decisiveness, and single-
minded sense of purpose for meeting the owner’s requirements that would be the mark of effective 
management.  If their own values are to concern themselves with the needs of other stakeholders, they 
would be expected to retain these within their private space and not taken to the public space of their 
working lives.  We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1 The more person-oriented a culture, the more managers will pursue wide stakeholder 
interests rather than focus on shareholder interests.  
 
Person Orientation Cultural Values and Business Aims 
Many factors can influence the aims pursued by businesses.  As well as institutional structure 
(particularly regarding ownership) and history, specific industry and firm conditions can also 
influence business aims.  Different owners will have different aims, and firms facing hard competitive 
conditions may focus on cash flow for survival more than firms in more benign conditions.  
Differences have been noted between countries.  UK and US managers are supposedly more 
concerned with financial returns than German and Japanese managers, who focus more on product 
attributes and quality (Albert 1995; Whitley, 1992).   
A ‘cultural’ school of management, however, sees the intent of a firm simply to express its culture 
and its values (Deal & Kennedy, 1999).  That managers’ aims may reflect national values has been 
empirically supported by Neelankavil et al. (2000), who found that middle managers’ understanding 
of ‘good performance’ was associated with a variety of national values measures.  We can expect the 
aims that are pursued by businesses to be influenced by person orientation national values in a similar 
way as stakeholders are affected.   Not only are the stakeholders and firm aims interrelated, but we 
can expect values directly to influence the aims pursued by managers.   
We can expect managers in societies with person-oriented values to display greater concern for the 
quality and security of working life for themselves and for their employees, for the quality of the 
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relationships within their firms and with others around the firms, for firm stability, and for wider 
social goals.  In task-oriented cultures, by contrast, we could expect managers to focus more on 
maximizing firm profitability and increasing shareholder value.  We can therefore hypothesize that 
person-orientation will be associated with holding a wide range of aims, both because there will be 
societal expectations that they should do so, and because they may well be recognizing a wider range 
of stakeholders.  We similarly can associate task – orientation with holding only financial aims:   
H2 The more person-oriented a culture, the more managers will pursue diverse aims rather than 
focus on financial aims. 
Time Orientation Cultural Values and Business Timeframes 
National values reflecting how different cultures see time in different ways have also been associated 
with the length of time over which achievements are sought, short-term (associated with Anglo-Saxon 
cultures) or long term (associated with some Eastern cultures and some northern European countries 
(Calori & de Woot, 1994; Hickson & Pugh, 1995).  Hofstede’s short-term and long-term orientation 
dimension is a complex concept, being developed from work by researchers working with managers 
in China (Hofstede & Bond, 1988). ‘Long term’ thinking reflects a desire for personal growth in its 
broadest sense, over and beyond the span of life, in which a pursuit for ‘virtue’ involves, inter alias, 
the fostering and development of valuable personal relationships.  The norms in ‘long term’ cultures 
are for managers to develop capabilities and strengths within their firms that will better assure long-
term success, in comparison to ‘short term’ values orientation norms, which are for the speedy 
achievement of financial outcomes, and not for prosaic goals, such as forming good relationships with 
others, even if these might be valued on a personal basis.   
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner’s (1997) research on orientations to time were not based on 
such a broad concept, it was related to how people viewed themselves and their lives within the time 
dimension.  Their findings for different countries, however, were broadly consistent with those of 
Hofstede, and show clear short future time orientations in some countries and long future time 
orientations in others (Table 3).  Both Hofstede (2001) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997)  
Table 3:  Empirically measured values of time-scales in different countries 
Values Measure:  Short -term (vs Long-term) Short (vs Long) time horizon 
Author: Hofstede  (2001. p.500) 
Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner  
(1997, p. 129) 
US HIGH HIGH 
UK HIGH HIGH 
Italy MEDIUM HIGH 
Germany HIGH MEDIUM 
France MEDIUM MEDIUM / LOW 
Sweden MEDIUM MEDIUM / LOW 
Netherlands LOW  HIGH 
Japan LOW MEDIUM 
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associate business short termism in the US with short-term values there.  Within US subsidiaries 
studied by Newman and Mollen (1996), long-term HR policies emphasizing job security were only 
associated with higher performance in Hofstede’s ‘long term’ nations, in ‘short term’ nations, short-
term policies were more appropriate.  While it might be self-evident that strategic short-termism or 
long-termism in managers’ thinking may be tied specifically to short-term or long-term national 
values orientations in the countries concerned, and idea that is much repeated in descriptive 
comparative management literature, it will be valuable to test: 
H3 The more long-term a culture, the more managers will pursue long term rather than short-term 
achievement.  
Before testing our hypotheses, we wanted to denote specific, quantifiable but meaningful terms for 
our business stakeholders, aims and timeframes that reflected how national values may be associated 
with these different aspects of business purposes, and for this, we undertook an initial qualitative 
exploration (Ghauri et al, 1995).   
Exploration of business purposes in international comparative cases 
We qualitatively analyzed four strategic investment decisions, which are singular event-focused 
encapsulations of the senior management task (Rajagopulan et al., 1993), in four companies (one each 
from Japan, the UK, the US and Germany) in the mature and consolidating vehicle components 
industry between 1994 and 1998.  Two hour semi-structured interviews, embracing all aspects of the 
processes and techniques involved in specific investment decisions, were undertaken with executives 
charged with coordinating them in English at their own business premises.  (To maintain 
confidentiality we name our German executive Deutchcom, our Japanese, Japcom, our British, 
Britcom and our American, Americom.)  The four case companies expressed their stakeholders, aims 
and time-frames differently (Table 4).   
Deutchcom and Japcom barely mentioned the needs of their shareholders, and the attention of both 
was on the future viability of the company as a whole – implying a diversity of important stakeholders 
without necessarily mentioning them separately.  Japcom’s cited various stakeholders, life-time 
employees being specifically mentioned as an important group given special attention.  This also had 
changed with the CEO, possibly reflecting Japanese particularism.  As Japcom noted:  
‘I think stakeholders these days know they are, customers, employees, and I think the corporation has to 
give lots of obligations to these stakeholders’. 
While Japcom and Deutchcom found owners relatively unimportant, both were then paying them 
greater attention. Britcom and Americom thought owners were more important, but they were 
perceived in different ways.  Britcom’s managers believed that the owners did not know what was 
good for the firm, so they surreptitiously pursued goals that they thought the owners would not want.  
Americom’s managers had a better view of the firm’s shareholders, and felt that they were fulfilling  
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Table 4: Meaning of ‘purposes’ in the four case businesses 
Firm: STAKEHOLDERS: AIMS: TIME FRAMES: 
Deutchcom: Company: owners not mentioned,  
Strategic viability, firm 
growth. Finance. Undefined long future  
Japcom: ‘The company as a whole’; Employees  A strong strategic position 
Life-time employment  
& management 
Britcom: Owners predominate Profits & profits growth  1-5 years overtly,  managers subverted  
Americom: Owners predominate; Profits, growth &  strategic development 
Profits: 1-2 years,  
Growth: 15 years. 
their needs.  We can distinguish two main orientations towards stakeholders can be distinguished, 
with which to test H1 in a wider data set.  One orientation, the shareholder focus, as demonstrated 
most clearly by Americom, shows focus only on the owners (shareholders).  The other, which we 
regard as the stakeholder approach, shows expression of concern also towards one or more of 
employees, the organization as a whole, and wider society or societal groups.   
Neither Deutchcom nor Japcom expressed their aims in a direct, clear or quantifiable way: they 
were multifaceted.  They both appeared to aim for strategic viability, growth, and success. Financial 
performance was of increasing concern, but remained unimportant in comparison with strategic 
success.  Deutchcom’s aims behind the investment were regarded as being mainly non-quantifiable, 
and for Japcom, achieving a good ‘position in the industry’ was the aim: 
 ‘… it’s not just the return on capital that is our only criteria. Another good consideration has to be keeping 
up with this evolution in the automotive industry. To be a successful automotive component supplier you 
have to be a global corporation … The bigger issue is are we going to be keeping up with the business, and 
surviving in the long term?’ 
Britcom was the most profit focused of all the firms, with stringent return on assets criteria for all 
investment decisions that were rarely reduced for longer-term strategic considerations:   
‘…we have a growth target of 10-15% a year on earnings per share. This is a permanent thing.’.  
Americom’s executive emphasized financial aims, but a wider view of the aims of the firm was 
taken as well: 
 ‘…if you get financials that are unbalanced with the business objectives, we are putting in all the money but 
you are taking all the product, or vice versa, you want to be sensitive to that…. […] We tend to force 
ourselves to make strategic decisions on direction, but we are not using the 15% as a cut-off…They are 50% 
for non-strategic investments’.  
Though deep case analysis reveals complex aims within Americom and Britcom on the part of the 
managers, the dominant expression of their aims were in financial terms.  When testing H2, we will 
distinguish financially focused aims involving profits, returns and cash-flows from broad strategic 
aims which are more wide ranging and less specific in terms of outcomes. 
In time frames, Deutchcom and Japcom’s main focus was long term strategic success over a period 
of 15 years or more.  Britcom’s objectives were phrased mainly in two or three year terms though the 
managers also adopted longer-term strategic criteria behind their decisions – in effect, they were 
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pursuing strategic development subject to minimum financial profits and growth targets on a one to 
five year horizon.  Americom aimed to achieve returns over a one to two year horizon, but also had 15 
year strategic objectives.  From this analysis, when we come to test H3, we will denote short-term as 
being intended achievements within 5 years, while long-term can mean achieving outcomes over an 
unspecified future period, or over a specified period of 10 years or more.  
Overall, therefore, these qualitative case analyses indicated useful categorizations for terms used in 
practice by managers that indicate a ‘stakeholder’ rather than ‘shareholder’ approach, ‘wide’ as 
against ‘financial’ aims, and ‘long’ as against ‘short’ time orientations to use in a quantitative study.   
Research approach and method 
To test these ideas in different countries in large numbers of respondents from traditional sampling 
procedures would have been prohibitively costly with such rich data gathering, and attracting a 
sufficient unbiased and representative sample of industrially and institutionally matched managers to 
the study in each country would not be feasible.  But here we are not concerned with how what the 
time frames, aims and stakeholders are in each country, only with how they differ between the 
countries so we do not need to examine a sample of representative firms.  We adapted an approach 
from medical research that faces similar requirements with a ‘quasi-experimental’ method, comparing 
groups that were closely matched in every respect except their nationality. With care and using 
appropriate statistical measures developed for the purpose, which require as few as eight or ten in 
each group, we can then attribute differences to their nationality (Pett, 1997; Conover, 1999).   
For this approach, because we are facing a wide range of other factors that can influence business 
purposes, the firms needed to be as equivalent in industrial, market, and organizational and 
institutional characteristics as possible.  We had a tight a-priori determination of the types of firms 
and respondents. The countries we studied are inevitably institutionally different, but are all mature, 
democratic industrial economies with European norms of individual freedoms and rights share more 
similarities than, say, nations from different continents.  All firms were in a niche sub-segment of the 
electronics industry in Standard Industrial Code 33.20/1, which developed and combined electronic 
hardware and software technologies to address the needs of industrial customers.  Their needs, 
technologies and standards being determined on a global scale, domestic factors are less important 
than international ones.  We spoke only to the CEOs who were also part or majority owners of their 
firms, so that we could consider them to be the prime architects of the firm’s purposes. 
The businesses and the CEOs  
Even though they were well matched, differences between the businesses in the three countries were 
inevitable, revealed in and post-hoc data analysis (Table 5).  The French firms were more focused on 
higher level specialist niches, and chose to remain smaller with higher value added, trading 
internationally through agents.  So they were smaller than the others, with smaller payrolls and  
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Table 5:  Descriptive statistics for the 41 firms in the testing phase of the study 
Variable (Means of each group): France The Netherlands United Kingdom 
Age of Firms (years): 13 18 17 
CEO Shareholding (%) 49 67 58 
Firm Turnover (€m) 1.4 7.3 5.9 
Payroll (Staff numbers) 21 45 44 
Age of CEOs 46 49 49 
Export ratio (Average, %) 11 28 40 
average turnover of €1.4m compared to €7.3m in the Netherlands and €5.9m in the UK.  Their direct 
export % (notwithstanding their actual international exposure) was lower.  These differences between 
the French and the other firms, however, mainly reflected chosen growth strategies and their lower 
commitment mode of foreign market entry choice rather than more profound differences.  More of the 
Dutch, and to a lesser extent the British businesses, were continuing to use lower margin subcontract 
activity to help to finance their development into the higher margin activity.  Reflecting local 
histories, the business sectors involved also differed: many in France were in telephony and defense, 
and many in Britain were in process monitoring control and switching equipment.  More of the French 
CEOs (65%) were educated to postgraduate level than both the British (27%) and the Dutch (7%), and 
while the Dutch CEOs were older than the French and British, they had less big company experience.   
These kinds of differences are inevitable, but matter only if they lead to different time frames, aims 
or stakeholders.  We checked for this by post-hoc cross-correlation of variables other than nationality, 
including industrial subdivisions, size bands, ages, export ratios, levels of CEO ownership, CEOs age, 
CEO educational level, and CEO previous experience against their expressed stakeholders, aims and 
time frames.  This revealed just one variable other than national background to be strongly and 
consistently associated with time frames, aims and stakeholders: whether or not the businesses had a 
major shareholding by a financial institution.  Whereas eight of the British firms had important 
institutional shareholders, just one French and one Dutch firm did so.  So we excluded these ten CEOs 
from the analysis so that we should not attribute associations to the British on grounds of their values 
rather than to an institutional factor. The remaining firms were similar: average ages were between 13 
and 18 years, average turnovers were less than €7.5m and payrolls were all less than 50.  The CEOs 
had similar backgrounds: all electronics engineers, and with averages ages between 45 and 50.   
41 firms without dominating outside shareholders remained for analysis, 12 in the Alpes-
Maritimes department of France, 14 in The Netherlands, and 15 in the country of Scotland in the UK.  
As the whole populations within regions of those countries of businesses of a very specific type, and 
not representative samples of companies in general in these regions, they were highly suitable for this 
protocol, because representative samples would reflect the institutional and industrial histories and 
structures of the regions and nations involved.   
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Data gathering  
Interview discussions, which took place between 2000 and 2002, focused on the CEOs’ assessment of 
the success (or otherwise) of their firms, and the considerations that went into their thinking when 
considering the future of their firms.  Strict consistency and structuring of the interview process was 
necessary to direct discussion to relevant topics and to achieve equivalent data from each interview 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1985).  To avoid the data being ‘cued’, we designed and piloted a highly 
structured ‘native category’ interview protocol (Buckley & Chapman, 1997) that attempted to access 
the interviewees’ own native categories of data by using non-directive questions and  would lead to 
conversations in which the CEOs could express their own underlying considerations and beliefs 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1991).  
After a preamble, interviewees gave a personal account of their development of their business, 
which yielded valuable context data, and led to a leading question ‘How successful, in your own 
terms, do you personally believe that your business has been?’.  A card presented five categories for 
response, from very successful to very disappointing, and though respondents typically pondering for 
some minutes, their response was of no interest as we have no basis for forming expectations as to 
what it would be.  Rather, a follow-up question   ‘What is the basis for that assessment?’ provoked an 
extensive discussion that revealed the sought-after information on their time frames, aims and 
stakeholders.  To triangulate these responses the concluding question ‘What do you think about when 
you consider the future of your business?’ led to a lengthy discussion about their management 
approach and thinking.  To maintain equivalence we deviated from this question order only to obtain 
clarification.  The interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ own business premises, in English 
in the Netherlands and the UK, but in French in France.  That this limited the full equivalence in the 
data sets was a concern, but was mitigated by use of an identical interview protocol, by the managers’ 
expressions of the phenomena having been clearly explicit, and by triangulation with follow-up 
questions.   
Data coding and analysis 
We coded the transcripts and notes from the interviews according to the categories derived from the 
qualitative analysis.  Concerning stakeholders, to test H1, the data was binary coded according to 
whether or not the CEOs had themselves and other owners as stakeholders (see table 6), and whether 
or not they had other interest groups (employees, the wider organizational interest, society generally) 
as stakeholders.  Individual CEOs could be coded to either or both groups.  This yielded three 
mutually exclusive groups in each of the three countries: those for whom only owners are 
stakeholders, those for whom only non-owners are stakeholders, and those who held owners and 
others to be stakeholders.  Reflecting the qualitative study, concerning aims (see table 7), the data was 
coded to whether or not the CEOs held aims for the firm that were financial, and whether they were to 
develop the organization as a whole.  But we were also interested in whether there would be a concern 
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for the development of relationships within and outwith the firm (reflecting femininity), and reflecting 
diffuseness, whether these owner-CEOs reflected their personal life goals in their business aims.  So 
in addition to these four coding categories, three exclusive groups were yielded through analysis: 
those with only financial aims, those with only other aims, and those financial and other aims.  
Further, we could combine the ‘relationship’ aims and the ‘personal life’ aims to examine if these 
were reflected in the Dutch group, from a culture with both femininity and diffuseness.  For time-
frames (see table 8), the CEOs’ time frames were coded to being up to 5 years, between 6 and 10 
years, and being over 10 years. 
The problems of coding bias and misinterpretation can be severe in this type of cross-cultural 
analysis (Usunier, 1998).  This was addressed in a number of ways.  First, the coding process was 
binary, the most robust form and least open to coding bias.  Second, the coding definitions had 
themselves been developed from the cross-cultural study of strategic investment decisions.  Third, text 
segments from interview transcripts and notes were explicitly attributed to codes, and these are 
available on request to enable replicability.  Fourth, coding system bias was checked with the data 
from three firms of each country being coded by three coders, one each from France, the Netherlands 
ad the UK, resulting in 94.2% coding agreement.  Finally, coding reliability was confirmed by the 
whole data set being coded by three further individuals from entirely different cultures who were 
unaware of the research questions or the background of the study, and this resulted in 92.8% coding 
agreement in stakeholders, 95.7% in aims and 94.3% in time frames.  The codes included in the 
analysis were as agreed by at least two of the three coders; repeating the analysis of the coded data 
with only those included by all three made no material difference in the direction of the results 
(Weber, 1990).  
Non-parametric tested whether or not there were differences between the three national groups.  
Following Conover (1999) and Pett (1997), we used the Fisher exact test, a non-parametric method 
for measuring the significance of differences that is both robust and more conservative that the chi-
squared test (Hirji et al., 1991).  Pearson’s Phi (Φ) was used to measure the strength of these 
differences, which can be interpreted as the more commonplace Pearson’s R (Hinkle et al., 1994).  
That the subjects were not samples does not restrict generalization to theory, but limits the technical 
validity of using these statistical tests of association in doing so, and the greatest care must be taken 
when making generalizations to differences between nations in businesses generally.  Nevertheless, 
the tests yield the confidence that is required in the associations that are and are not found.   
Findings 
Hofstede’s research, with support from Trompenaars (Table 2), shows The Netherlands to be the 
country with some of the most person-oriented values not just in Europe, but in the world, and the UK 
is one of the countries with the least person-oriented values (Hofstede, 2001, P. 84).  H1 leads us to 
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expect the Dutch CEOs to hold wider stakeholder notions more than the French or British CEOs.  
Table 6 presents the incidence of the phenomena in the three countries, as well as the measures of 
differences between the groups (as Φ) with the significance (p) of any differences as measured by the 
Fisher’s F-test. It is clear from Table 6 that the Dutch do not have wider stakeholder notions.  Indeed 
it is the British with the widest stakeholder sets, hold others as stakeholders significantly more that the 
French (Ф=0.40; p=.08) or the Dutch (Ф=0.35; p=.10).   
Further, under H1, with Britain having very person-orientation values, we expect them to focus 
more on the owner as the only stakeholder, but it was the Dutch that did this.  Nearly all the Dutch 
CEOs talked about what they wanted for their own personal benefit from the business, whereas only 
half the French and 60% of the British did so.  Overall, the French CEOs acknowledged wider 
stakeholder notions the least, with the Dutch and not the British that recognized the owners as 
stakeholders the most, not following the pattern of person-orientation in national values at all.  
National values are poor predictors of the stakeholders that would be expressed by the CEOs.   
The person-orientation national values, however, were better predictors of the different revealed 
aims of the CEOs in the different countries, supporting H2.  Under H2, the low person-orientation of 
the British was expected to lead them to focus on financial aims comparison especially with the Dutch 
and also with the French.  We found this.  Most of the British CEOs expressed financial aims, in 
comparison with a quarter of the French (Ф=.41, p=.04) and less than half of the Dutch.  But with one 
CEO from the entire population holding only financial CEOs, the aims patterns we see are quite 
complex, and there is not a clear relationship here between person-oriented cultures and not having 
financial goals.  For example, the French CEOs and not the Dutch CEOs held financial goals least, 
and held only non-financial goals the most.   
But H2 is supported by the patterns of aims that the CEOs held.  Most of the British combine 
financial goals with a general notion of the development of their organization.  Of all three groups, 
more of the Dutch CEOs expressed concern for their relationships, a ‘feminine’ concern, and reflected 
their own life goals and aspirations the most as well.  In each of these cases, the differences were not  
Table 6:  Findings concerning the CEOs’ stakeholders 
 
N ( %) Ф(p) 
French Dutch British  French v Dutch French v British Dutch v British 
THE CEOS’ STAKEHOLDERS ARE:       
Owners? 6 (50%) 13 (93%) 9 (60%) .482 (.021) - .384 (.049) 
Others (non-owners)? 9 (75%) 11 (79%) 15 (100%) - .395 (.075) .352 (.100) 
CEOS’ STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS:       
Only owners? 3 (25%) 3 (21%) 0 (0%) - - - 
Only others (non-owners)? 6 (50%) 1 ( 8%) 6 (40%) .392 (.075) - .399 (.042) 
Owners & others (non-owners)? 3 (25%) 10 (71%) 9 (60%) .456 (.020) .428 (.032) - 
  Total: 12 (100%) 14 (100%) 15 (100%) - - - 
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Table 7:  Findings concerning aims  
 
N ( %) Ф(p) 
French Dutch British  French v Dutch French v British Dutch v British 
THE CEOS’ AIMS ARE:       
Financial? 3 (25%) 6 (43%) 10 (67%) - .414 (.038) - 
Organizational development 8 (67%) 12 (86%) 15 (100%) - .466 (.028) - 
Relationships within the firm 3 (25%) 6 (43%) 4 (27%) - - - 
Personal life goals 5 (42%) 10 (71%) 7 (47%) - - - 
Relationships and Personal  2 (17%) 8 (57%) 2 (13%) .483 (.022) - .560 (.009) 
ANALYSIS, CEOS’ AIMS ARE:       
Only financial? 1 ( 8%) 0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%) - - - 
Only other (non-financial)? 9 (75%) 8 (57%) 5 (33%) - .474 (.019) - 
Financial & other? 2 (16%) 6 (43%) 9 (60%) - .316 (.092) - 
  Total: 12 (100%) 14 (100%) 15 (100%) - - - 
statistically significant, but we do see the holding of more diverse aims in the Dutch CEOs, who 
demonstrated greater concern for relationships, and reflected their own lives within their place of 
work more than did the British and French CEOs.  Here, most of the Dutch CEOs combined personal 
life goals with relationship aims for their firms within their aims, but few of the French (Ф=.48, 
p=0.02) or British (Ф=.56, p=0.01) did so, both powerful and highly significant differences.  So while 
the patterns are far from clear-cut, we can identify some association with the national values 
orientations, and some strong and statistically significant differences.  
In the area of time-orientation (Table 3), Britain is a country which both Hofstede and 
Trompenaars find to have with some of the most short-term values.  They disagree over the 
Netherlands: Hofstede found it to have some of the most long-term values, while Trompenaars found 
France to be longer-term than the other two countries.  Nevertheless, we would expect under H3 that 
the British CEOs would show the most short-term strategic orientation.  They did not.  It was the 
French CEOs that displayed the least long-termism (and greatest short-termism), and while not greatly 
less long-term than the British, the difference was statistically significant (Ф=.36, p=0.09).  The 
hypotheses concerning time frames (H3) was clearly not supported, and time-orientation values are 
particularly poor predictors of long and short term business orientations in these businesses, no matter 
whose measures we choose to employ. 
Table 8:  Findings concerning CEOs’ timeframes  
 
N ( %) Ф(p) 
French Dutch British  French v Dutch French v British Dutch v British 
THE CEOS’ TIMEFRAMES ARE:       
5 years or less? 2 (17%) 1 (7%) 2 (13%) - - - 
Between 6and 10 years? 9 (75%) 8 (57%) 7 (47%) - .287 (137) - 
11 years or more? 1 ( 8%) 5 (36%) 6 (40%) .324 (.117) .359 (.075) - 




A distinctive feature of our study, of qualitatively analyzing associations in one type of firm before 
testing them quantitatively in another therefore yields greater confidence in where we can generalize 
our findings across firms more widely, and where we can not, and in how we may, and may not use 
the national values research.  Most evidently, the associations between national values and strategic 
purposes that we could have drawn from our qualitative examination of in four large public firms did 
not carry through to our more rigorous test, where we found some association only in one specific 
aspect of purposes.   
Confirming Schein’s (1985) observation that individual life goals lie at the heart of culture, 
national values were of some value in predicting business aims.  There are indications why the 
national values based predictions would work here.  The business aims these CEOs expressed 
reflected their own personal life dreams and aspirations, and here close analysis of the transcripts 
reveals clear reflection of national values within the CEOs’ discussions.  There was no contradiction 
between what they wanted to do as individuals, reflecting the cultures in which they worked, and what 
they were institutionally required to do, because they all effectively controlled their organizations, 
through ownership.   
This feature was not present in our tests in the area of stakeholders, where national values 
completely failed to predict the behavior observed.  The stakeholders in the minds of this particular 
type of CEO, ones who have done the extraordinary task of creating and developing their own 
organizations, appear to be influenced by stronger forces than the national values that they are 
expected to display.  That these individuals, especially in the Netherlands, recognize their families to 
a high degree, reflects how there appears to be other forces operating here, perhaps other values, or 
perhaps other and complex institutional factors, that are stronger than those person oriented ones that 
we were working with.  Some national values can be difficult to interpret in terms of likely 
management behavior, and can contradict each other, so there are dangers are clear when we try to 
treat these things simplistically. 
This may well help to explain the surprising absence of an association between long and short term 
values and CEO long-termism and short-termism, where we would expect the links between the 
values and behavior to be self-evident.  The transcripts reveal how there were more important forces 
at play which led the owner-CEOs’ time scales to be very similar between the firms.  In this industry, 
rapid scientific developments make the environment beyond eight to ten years unvisionable, but with 
new developmental projects taking three to five years, the time scales are constrained notwithstanding 
local national values.  The danger of making glib associations between national values research and 




We have put national values as a predictor of the purpose of firms in different countries to the test, 
using care to separate the influences of industrial and institutional contexts as much as possible.  The 
study highlights how when attempting to see if there is an association between national values and 
management behavior, we have to be confident that important institutional and industrial factors are 
not at play.  In the real kaleidoscope of businesses internationally, some firms are owner managed, 
some stock-exchange listed and some publicly owned.  Some mainly have consumer customers, some 
business customers, and some public sector customers.  Some face intensively competitive home 
markets and some comfortable oligopolies.  We rarely face only the CEO-owner managed firms we 
studied here where firm behavior clearly reflects manager values.  We normally face firms such as in 
our vehicle components manufacturers where it reflects interplay of interests and factors.  These other 
factors are so important that generalized statements concerning business behavior on grounds only of 
national values is foolish.   
But national values are important too, and there are some conditions where national values can be 
of value in predicting behavior, as we found in the CEOs aims in our study.  So we can both overplay 
and underplay national values as explanators of management behavior.  The quality and consistency 
of much of the national values research makes it easy to overplay them; they dominate our 
comparative management research, our textbooks on international management, and our interactions 
with the business world (Tipton, 2006).  But it is also possible, given the limited quantitative analyses 
of their effects, and the mixed success of the few there are, to dismiss national values altogether, and 
this would also be an error.  The phenomenon of culture is so rich that it can be argued that national 
values cannot meaningfully measure of it, that the massive simplification required for quantitative 
testing of its possible consequences makes this an invalid activity, and that this subject is amenable 
only to qualitative research and not to rigorous testing.  We reject this view, instead arguing that we 
need rigorous tests to establish confidence in and generalizability of our findings.   
Improving our understanding of why business behavior differs between countries needs 
measurements of how it does, where we still have little to work with.  Here we have made some 
measurements and they appear to have been valid:  for example in our distinction of firms with 
‘financial’ aims that focus on profit and other measures of financial performance, and firms with aims 
that include relationships between people at work, and personal goals.  These types of categorizations 
would be useful for international business researchers and managers.  The rich data required makes 
this difficult to do with large scale data methods, so here (and acknowledging our simplifications and 
imperfections) our ‘quasi-experimental’ approach, here used to measuring and testing cultures’ 
consequences, may help at lest to identify important differences between countries.  
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This is important because international managers, whose international business activity nearly 
always involves meeting, exploring, discussing, negotiating and agreeing with counterparts of other 
nations should expect differences in the norms and expectations of the managers they encounter.  
These may reflect national values, but also other factors as they would ‘at home’.  Successful 
negotiation requires an open mind and sensitivity to differences in business purposes, and they should 
be prepared for ways of thinking about what businesses are for that differs from their own, be 
unfamiliar, and may only slowly become evident.  Sensitivity to these differences is the mark of a 
good international manager and negotiator.  But mechanistically predicting beliefs and behavior from 
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